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1. Introduction 
Promoting public accountability plays an ever increasing role in the recent discourse on development 
cooperation. It is said to encourage a more efficient use of public funds, to decrease corruption, add 
to more legitimate, responsive and democratic institutions including government and therefore to 
enhance aid effectiveness (OECD/DAC, 2005). To realize these ideals, a wide range of stakeholders, 
from international institutions, national governments to International Non-Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs), unite in their elusive quest for the golden standard to promote public 
accountability in their policies. More accountability seems to have become the universal cure for all 
democratic deficits and ineffective policies in developing countries.  
However, in contrast to their high expectations, accountability promotion policies have not yet 
delivered the expected results. This paper seeks to understand why this has been the case by 
analysing the current state of affairs of promoting public accountability in development cooperation 
with a focus on donor interventions and particularly on the interaction between donors’ concepts, 
policies and practices. In other words, this paper does not examine the possible explanations for 
failing results on the recipient side, although few will be mentioned. We start by exploring how 
accountability gained importance in development cooperation and what the underlying development 
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paradigms, ideologies and concepts are. Before describing the main donor practices in accountability 
promotion, four interrelated key accountability relationships that characterize accountability in 
development cooperation are analysed and discussed.  The paper proceeds by presenting a new 
perspective on assessing donor policies and practices to understand the mismatch between 
expectations and results. From these insights, the conclusions are formulated as well as the 
recommendations, both for future aid interventions as well as for further research in the area of 
promoting public accountability. The paper draws on qualitative research done by the two authors 
on different donor interventions, as well as on a study of academic and empirical literature and 
evaluation reports. 
2. The rise of public accountability in development cooperation   
The concept of public accountability in development cooperation gained importance over the last 
decades as prevailing development models or paradigms shifted. From a concept that was merely 
interpreted as a financial obligation to account for the use of aid money in the eighties, during the 
so-called Washington Consensus
2
, it gradually came to be seen as a vital aspect for realizing the main 
socio economic and political objectives in current development cooperation policies by all major 
donors including International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs). There are four main trends 
that have contributed to this development. 
 
The first trend is related to the democratization processes that were sparked of by the end of the 
Cold War. It underlined the growing demand from citizens worldwide to hold authority to account 
and to get improved access to decision-making processes that affected their lives.  Bilateral and 
multilateral donors as well as INGOs strongly supported these democratic transition processes. While 
the former concentrated on working with governments  on establishing the formal democratic 
institutions that should strengthen political, legal and administrative (including financial) 
accountability within these countries, as well as towards donors, the latter engaged more in working 
with civil society, local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Community Based 
Organizations (CBOs)
3
  to make citizens aware of their rights and to empower them to improve their 
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 The Washington Consensus was built on structural adjustment  
3
 In this paper civil society is defined as the realm where citizens associate voluntarily, outside their families or 
businesses , to advance their interests, ideas or ideologies (Scholte 2000 as quoted in Jordan 2007:9). For the 
definition of NGOs and CBOs we support Jordan who describes them as “self-governing, private, not for profit 
organizations with an explicit social mission. They are embedded in civil society, distinct from political society…. 
they can organize voice in political debates,……..They may provide services, or advocacy to promote particular 
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voice and participation in decision making processes. In many countries formal elections and basic 
formal accountability systems have been put in place, processes of constitutional or legislative 
reforms have been encouraged and overall civil liberties and political freedom increased.  
 
However, these reforms did not automatically lead to more democratic and accountable behaviour 
of the power holders. In fact, very often the formal, ‘de jure’ accountability systems, laid down in 
laws or regulations, bore little resemblance to the actual ‘de facto’ accountability processes in which 
ordinary citizens had to function (Goetz and Jenkins 2005: 10). Citizens in these young developing 
democracies were often not in a position to hold the powerful to account because the conventional 
mechanisms through which they would seek redress, like elections
4
, parliament, supreme audit 
institutions, the judiciary, media, political parties or specialized oversight agencies, were weak, 
corrupt, captured or biased towards the interests of certain (elite) groups in society and to the 
exclusion of others (the poorest) (Ackerman 2005; Goetz and Jenkins 2005).  On top of that, with 
regard to development aid, citizens found their governments accounting more to donors than to 
their own citizens, in terms of the planning and spending of aid money.   
 
The second trend that is responsible for a more prominent role of accountability in development 
cooperation is the discussion on aid effectiveness. Notwithstanding the successes that have been 
realized, the overall socio economic development effects of development cooperation
5
 to increase 
economic growth, alleviate poverty and promote social development, from the structural adjustment 
programs in the eighties, the poverty reduction strategies in the nineties, to the millennium 
development goals and (good) governance inspired programs in the new millennium, have been 
disappointing (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Dollar and Easterly 1999; Easterly 2001, 2003; Martens et al 
2002; Tsikata, 1998). Underperformance, ineffectiveness and corruption in developed and 
developing countries led to decreased public trust and confidence in development cooperation, both 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
issues…..They are usually non membership based and linked to each other in networks or alliances that 
sometimes take the form of more formal associations………Community-based organisations may have goals 
comparable to NGOs but are small, local and usually less absorbed in networks” (Jordan 2007:8,9) 
4
 Przeworski et al (1999) Chaper 1 critically discusses the role of elections as mechanisms of political 
accountability 
5
 This refers to the Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD as well as to the IMF and World Bank programs. There are no overall data available about the total 
amount, let alone the impact of INGO and NGO work in developing countries. However there are many 
individual evaluations available per organization. 
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in developed and developing countries over the last decades ( Goetz and Jenkins 2005). Tax payers 
and traditional donators of development aid increasingly demanded for more effective spending and 
better results for their money while their counterparts in developing countries demanded for more 
accountable and democratic governments.  
 
One of the ways to counter these negative trends in aid effectiveness and meet citizens demands in 
both developing and developed countries brought 35 bilateral donors, 26 multilaterals and 56 
recipient countries and some international NGOs together to sign the so called ‘Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness’ in 2005 (OECD/DAC, 2005). With this declaration, the signatories  committed 
themselves explicitly to align their policies and administrative systems more with recipient-partner 
governments’ development agenda and systems, to respect ownership of the recipient- partner over 
their development process, to harmonize  aid interventions among the donor community, to manage 
for results and to strengthen mutual accountability between partner government and donor 
(OECD/DAC 2005).  Although the Paris declaration was vague in what it exactly meant by mutual 
accountability and only in its sub clauses and in the follow up in Accra in 2008 referred to the need 
for strengthening accountability from recipient governments to their domestic citizens, it certainly 
succeeded in boosting the discussion about the importance of accountability in the wider context of 
aid effectiveness, development, good governance and democratization.   
 
The third trend that contributed to the rise of accountability in development cooperation is 
globalization. New international actors like multinational corporations, international law institutions 
and international networks came to the stage in developing countries. However, what became clear 
with the entry of these new international actors was that not only they, but also the traditional 
international donor agencies, INGOs and Bretton and Woods Institutions, operated outside the 
classical state-based accountability mechanisms of aid recipient countries. This reflected the 
‘democratic deficit’
6
 in development cooperation, where international donors do not account to 
citizens in developing countries, while they are affecting their lives.  Goetz and Jenkins therefore 
have argued that "imperfect democratization and uneven globalization have highlighted the failures 
of conventional accountability mechanisms and the need for substantial institutional renewal”(Goetz 
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International Monetary Fund etc. The argument of the democratic deficit is however also valid for other 
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of a multi-level governance network 
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and Jenkins 2005:2 ). They conclude that this is most urgent for developing countries as people will 
turn away from democracy if it does not deliver accountable governance (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:2).  
Although accountability towards beneficiaries was a heavily debated issue among INGOs in the 
nineties in the broader context of their legitimacy and representation
7
, it only recently gained 
stronger importance in the aid policies of bilateral and multilateral donors, albeit only towards 
recipient governments and not to the ultimate beneficiaries or citizens, in the ongoing discussion on 
interpreting mutual accountability.  
 
The fourth trend that contributed to a stronger focus on accountability in development cooperation 
is related to the shift in the development paradigm in which the role of governance
8
gained 
importance in realizing pro poor development. It became generally recognized that governance 
structures and institutions fulfill a key role in explaining differences in economic growth and social 
welfare (Dollar and Pritchett 1998; North 1990; Rodrik and Subramania 2003). Formal and informal 
institutions, including those in the multi-leveled aid system itself, determine the strategies, interests 
and incentives of policymakers and condition the leeway for the various stakeholders in the policy 
processes (Easterly 2003; Gibson et al 2005; Helmke and Levisky 2004; Jütting et al eds. 2007; 
Martens et al 2002). Accountability, as it underpins the allocation and use of power, is at the heart of 
how changes in governance come about (Day and Klein, 1987:21; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007:11; 
Goetz and Jenkins 2005:5; Kaufmann et al 2005; Kjaer 2004:14; Smith 2007:17-44).  It therefore 
gained even greater importance in development cooperation policies.  
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 See on this topic for instance Cavill and Sohail 2007; Brown and Moore 2001; Edwards and Hulme 1996; 
Jordan and Tuijl 2006; Kearns 1996, Lindenberg and Bryant 2001. Within the literature on (I) NGO 
accountability three forms of accountability are generally defined: ‘downward accountability’ towards 
beneficiaries or clients, ‘upward accountability to donors or ‘patrons’ and ‘internal’ or ‘organizational 
accountability’ to themselves and their missions 
8
  See definition on Governance: Pierre (2000):3,4;  Kjaer (2004): 3-18, Smith (2007):3-6. For donor definitions 
see: OECD: http://www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2649_34565_45818128_1_1_1_1,00.html;  World 
Bank:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,
contentMDK:20513159~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497024,00.html; EU: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0615:FIN:EN:PDF 
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3. Defining and Analysing public accountability in Development Cooperation: four key 
relationships 
Now we have shown how accountability has become a crucial aspect of development cooperation 
policies, it is time to analyze more specifically what the key accountability relations are that 
characterize the accountability debate in development cooperation, how they relate to the classical 
model of delegation representation and accountability, how they are interconnected, what actors 
are involved, what is at stake, how accountability is supposed to be rendered and what is supposed 
to be the function of accountability in these relationships.   
However, before doing that it is important to contextualize the discussion about defining the concept 
of accountability. There is a lot of fuzziness around defining public accountability both conceptually 
among scholars as well as practically in the way donors operationalize the concept in policies and 
interventions in development cooperation. However, essentially ‘public or democratic accountability’ 
refers to the complex social process between citizens and State
9
 in which the state is obliged to 
account to citizens for 1) the use of public and natural resources, 2) the way policy decisions are 
taken and how they perform with regard to serving the wider public interest in a resource efficient, 
effective and fair matter and 3) the way they act and execute their public jobs, within the law, fair, 
non-corrupt and legitimate.  Public accountability is said to have four key functions in a society. First 
it provides for democratic checks and control of government which enhances trust in the democratic 
system. Secondly it would prevent corruption and the misuse of power. Thirdly it is supposed to 
improve the functioning, effectiveness, responsiveness and learning of government and the public 
sector. And finally, indirectly it contributes to governments’ legitimacy (Bovens 2007:465).
10
  
Although there is a lively debate on the specific meaning of public accountability, the key aspects 
that most political scientists can agree on are transparency of information, answerability or 
justification and enforcement or sanctioning (Bovens  2005; Bovens et al 2008; Bovens and 
Schillemans (eds) 2009; Ebrahim and Weisband (2007); McCandless 2001; Mulgan 2000, 2003; O’ 
Donnell 1999; Prezworski et al(eds) 1999; Schedler et al (eds) 1999; Strom 2000, 2003). Therefore in 
this paper public accountability is defined as a specific contextual social process between an actor 
and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to provide information and to explain and justify 
                                                           
9
 The State refers to all representatives of the State, both elected politicians and non-elected representatives  
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 Bovens also mentions public catharsis as an indirect function of accountability, like the functioning of the 
Truth Commission in South Africa 
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behaviour and conduct , the forum can pose questions and provide (positive or negative) judgement 
that can have consequences that the actor needs to accept. The process consists of three phases: 
phase I Information exchange, phase II debating and phase III consequences (sanctions, rewards and/ 
or learning) (Bovens 2007; Bovens and Schillemans 2009; Mulgan 2003).     
What becomes clear in section two is that public accountability within development cooperation 
cannot simply be defined and analyzed within the context of the classical state-based accountability 
mechanisms of representative democracies. In this common system citizens periodically delegate 
power to their elected representatives via elections, in return the latter needs to account to citizens 
(the electorate) for the use of this power with regard to choices and results in public policies and 
budgets.  Accountability relations in development cooperation however, are shaped by various 
decision-making arenas that differentiate along geographical and functional lines and that are 
interlinked in both hierarchical and non-hierarchical ways.
11
  Therefore accountability in 
development cooperation needs to be seen in a complex multi-level governance context. This is 
illustrated by figure 1 below.  
Figure 1: Three governance arenas in development cooperation and the accountability directions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1)-(4) correspond to the actor- forum relationships as described in table 1   
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 This type of processes is described by Eberlein and Kerwer 2004 and Papadopoulos 2007 in the context of 
New Governance in the European Union. However it can also be applied to the context of Development 
Cooperation  
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Next to the fact that development cooperation is a multilevel governance process, the public policy 
process in developing countries is also increasingly shaped by a multilevel governance context in 
which governments of developing countries are expected to account to external organizations that 
are mostly not established in a democratic way (Burnell 2009:3).  
Although it is evident that figure one is only a simplified version of reality in which many actors have 
been left out, it illustrates that decision making and governance in development cooperation takes 
place in at least three different governance arenas that all refer to different sets of accountability 
relationships between different groups of interacting public and private actors with their own 
priorities and ideologies, each shaped by their specific socio-economic, legal, historic and cultural 
context, while being interconnected in development cooperation.  
Within this multi-level governance context, four key accountability relationships can be identified 
that characterize the current debate on accountability in development cooperation and that are 
strongly interconnected (see figure 1: (1)(2)(3)(4)). Of these four the first (1), the relationship 
between recipient governments and their citizens (so called domestic public accountability) can be 
seen as the most prominent public policy objective of donors in promoting accountability in 
development cooperation. This political accountability relationship refers to the classical delegation- 
representation- accountability relationship in representative democracies which is built on the 
hierarchic principal agent model.
12
 In this relationship governments of recipient countries need to 
account for the planning, use and results of aid money and other public funds and policies to their 
citizens via the formal democratic institutions like elections and parliament. The relationship is 
supposed to strengthen democracy, enhance more effective and responsive government, which 
would contribute to governments’ legitimacy.  
This is the most prominent and publically discussed accountability relationship as it relates closest to 
the wider objectives of development cooperation of promoting democratic, effective and legitimate 
governance, which, according to the latest development paradigm, provides the best chances to 
ultimately increase sustainable economic growth, alleviate poverty and to strengthen inclusive social 
development in these countries. Donors support governments and related state or semi state 
institutions, the so-called supply side of public accountability, to account better to their citizens. They 
also support citizens and civil society groups, to strengthen the so-called demand side of public 
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delegation, accountability model see Bendor et al.(2001) and Lupia (2003) 
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accountability.
13
  Promoting domestic accountability gained extra importance among donors with the 
introduction of the new aid modalities like general budget and sector aid in which the money cannot 
be traced any longer to a specific project but goes to the overall budget of the government.
14
 This 
created a much stronger dependency relation between recipient and donors (2), as only with the 
good functioning of domestic political accountability (1) and administrative systems in the recipient 
country, the donor will be able to account for the use of aid money to its own constituency (3). 
The second key accountability relationship in development cooperation (2) takes place in the 
international arena and refers to the aid recipients who need to account for aid money and results to 
the donor. This is called external accountability, to emphasize that the political actors account to a 
forum that is located out of the country, instead of to their domestic democratic forum (citizens).  It 
is a hierarchic administrative/financial accountability relationship with potentially serious political 
and socio economic consequences.  In case the recipient government does not account sufficiently 
with regard to the use of aid money and results, the donor may decide to withdraw or stop providing 
aid. This could have strong political consequences for those in power (voted out of office, 
impeachment etc.) as well as socio economic consequences for citizens (poverty). More importantly 
however with regard to domestic public accountability is the fact that this strong sanctioning 
mechanism in the hands of donors tends to make governments to account more to donors than to 
their own citizens. Neither citizens nor the official representative bodies like parliament have 
sufficient means to scrutinize or exert effective ex ante and ex post oversight over their 
governments, let alone over donors (Eberlei 2001, 2007).
15
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 The supply side usually is more supported by bilateral and multilateral donors, the demand side by INGOs as 
well as bilateral and multilateral donors – see also section 4 
14
 These new aid modalities, introduced since Paris 2005, are the so called Program Based Approaches (PBAs) 
that provide coordinated aid in support of locally owned development strategies. The most common modalities 
are General Budget Support (GBS) that supports national poverty reduction strategies, Sector Budget Support 
and common Basket Funds. The latter two support the so called Sector wide Approaches  (SWAps) (Williamson 
and Dom 2010: viii) 
15
 Eberlei (2001, 2007) concluded that parliaments were hardly involved in the design of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Plans that were supposed to be designed in a participatory and representative way and would lead to 
more domestic accountability. The ‘new’ aid modality of budget aid, as it is added to a country’s general 
budget, is supposed to follow the domestic trajectory of scrutinizing the budget. However, in practice 
parliaments are often too weak or lack political will to scrutinise their governments for the benefit of the 
general public.  
10 
 
So donors find themselves in the paradoxical situation that the nature of their aid relationship (2) 
with recipient governments actually impedes their development policy objective of enhancing strong 
domestic public/democratic accountability towards citizens (1).
 16
  They try to compensate for this 
democratic deficit by supporting domestic public accountability (1) on the one hand (supply & 
demand sides) and increasing their own accountability towards recipients by enhancing mutual 
accountability on the other hand (4).   
The third key accountability relationship within development cooperation (3) occurs in the domestic 
arena of the donor country and refers to donor agencies
17
 (and INGOs) that need to account for the 
effective and fair
18
 use of public (tax) money and/or donations to the general public. This is a 
conventional political accountability relation in the donor country, embodying the hierarchic 
delegation- representation- accountability model of representative democracies
19
 that emphasizes 
democratic and effective functioning of government and is important for its legitimacy. This 
accountability relationship is not so much discussed as a public policy objective of development 
cooperation, however, it is of crucial importance as it not only sets the financial parameters for 
development cooperation with regard to how much money will be allocated, it also tends to 
influence donors policy choices as they know they ultimately need to be able to account to their 
constituency.  
The last and fourth accountability relationship (4) that colors the debate about accountability in 
development cooperation is also situated in the international arena. It refers to a rather new 
phenomenon that was initiated by the Paris declaration in which a more ownership and partnership 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The marginal role of parliaments (‘uncoupled-ness’ with decision-making in networks) is also mentioned as one 
of the problems for democratic accountability in multi- level network governance for instance by Papadopoulos 
(2007):474 
16
 This relation between aid recipient and donor also exists between local NGO or CBO and INGO towards the 
ultimate beneficiaries of their aid (a part of the citizenry). 
17
 Donor agencies are governmental departments in some countries and independent agencies in other 
countries 
18
 Relating to the ideological normative objectives of development cooperation  
19
 Here is referred to donors that embody representative democracies and not to authoritarian and non-
representative forms of democracy. 
11 
 
oriented relationship between recipient country and donor was promoted.
20
  In this relationship 
donor agencies are supposed to feel obliged to voluntary (non-hierarchic) account to recipient 
governments, alias their development partners. This is referred to as mutual accountability. It is also 
a way by which donors seek to compensate for the democratic deficit in the recipient donor 
relationship, albeit not to citizens in recipient countries (2). Nevertheless, it is still very much unclear 
about what donors need to be accountable to recipient governments (Wood et al 2008:24-28). In 
different contexts different features are mentioned like jointly defining development results, 
respecting recipient countries administrative and financial systems, in time and transparent 
disbursement of funds, transparency in conditions etc. (European Commission 2010:11). This should 
be realized through political dialogue, participatory processes and via contractual agreements.  Up to 
this moment this is an ongoing debate that lacks clear outcomes. What is clear however, is the 
asymmetric position recipient governments are in, as they have no appropriate sanctions in case of 
noncompliance of donors other than refusing the aid.
21
 
From the above it is clear that there is a strong interconnectedness between these four key 
accountability relationships. It is also important to mention that all of these relationships are 
dynamic. There are two main reasons for that, the first is that they are shaped by their specific local 
environment of institutions, history, legal framework, socio-economic circumstances and cultural 
beliefs and tradition that are dynamic too. The second reason is that the actors and forums in these 
relationships have multiple formal and informal accountabilities towards other actors and forums in 
which they might even change roles: the current actors might become forums in other relationships 
and vice versa (Koppell 2005).  These other accountability relationships and the incentives that they 
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 See Paris Declaration principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization, coordination, managing for results 
and mutual accountability. The notion of partnership was not new. It was introduced in development 
cooperation by the World Bank around 1999 when it launched the Poverty, Reduction, Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
for low income countries that should be developed by a participatory approach and tailored to country 
circumstances.  
21
 Refusing aid, although it probably affects the recipient most (depending on type of aid), might in some cases 
be felt as a sanction by donors. Withdrawing aid might have reputational effects on the donors’ foreign policy, 
might have effects in the export sector of the donor country and definitely has an effect on the employment in 
the development cooperation business within the donor country. So threatening not to accept aid can 
sometimes function as a sanctioning mechanism in accountability relations.  
12 
 
create can fundamentally influence the way actors and forums behave and make choices in the 
discussed relationships (Behn 2001)
22
 
Table 1 summarizes the four key accountability relationships and their basic features  
Table 1.  Mapping the four key accountability relations in development cooperation (1-4) 
Actor Government RC  Aid Recipient  Donor  Donor 
Forum Citizen RC (1) Donor (2) Constituency DC (3) Recipient (4) 
About what Budget, Planning, 
Results (National 
(Budget)  (ex-ante). 
Effective, efficient, and 
fair use of Aid (ex post) 
Finances & 
Results (ex-ante 
& ex post) 
Finances & Results               
(ex- ante & ex post) 
Jointly defining of 
development results, In 
time aid disbursement, 
Transparency in 
conditions (ex- ante) 
How  
(mechanisms) 
Elections, Parliament, 
Effective 
decentralization, 
Participatory decision 
making (at local levels) 
Accounting 
Systems, Annual 
Reports, impact 
assessments 
Depends on actor: In case of 
government being donor: via 
Parliament, or via Media. In 
case of NGO to members, via 
annual (evaluation) report. 
Ngo to donators: media, 
annual report, ICT 
Participatory processes 
like Political dialogue 
with stakeholders and 
contractual 
agreements 
Why  
(nature of 
relationship) 
Hierarchic: Principal 
Agent, classical 
delegation in 
democracy 
Hierarchic: 
Principal Agent 
Diverse, in case of tax payers 
and membership org: 
hierarchic P/A delegation in 
democracy. In case of 
donations: non hierarchic or 
voluntary 
Non-Hierarchic, 
voluntary  
Form of 
accountability 
Public & Political Public & Admini-
strative-financial/ 
mutual, politically 
relevant 
Public & Administrative – 
financial  
Mutual 
Type of 
accountability 
Domestic accountability 
in RC 
External 
accountability 
from RC to DC 
Domestic accountability in DC External accountability 
from DC to RC 
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 One example is organizational accountability. These organizational accountabilities and the incentives that 
they create can significantly influence the way aid is designed, delivered, monitored and evaluated (on the 
donor side) as well as the way it is implemented and delivers results or not ( on the receiving sides). 
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Function of 
accountability 
Democratisation, 
Effectiveness of public 
policy & services, Anti -
corruption, Responsive-
ness, Legitimacy  
Effectiveness, 
sustainability and 
fairness 
(democratic) of 
spending of aid 
money 
Legitimacy and Effectiveness 
of spending of money (taxes, 
donations) and about 
fairness/democratic ways as 
idealistic normative 
objectives of development 
aid 
Partnership for 
effectiveness of 
development aid: 
mutual accountability 
RC = recipient country   DC = donor country, (1)- (4) correspond to the governance arena’s in which the actor- forum 
relationships take place as shown in figure 1 
 
4. Practices of promoting public accountability in Development Cooperation  
Section three identified promoting public accountability within the recipient country (so called 
domestic public accountability) between government and citizens (1) as the main public policy 
objective of donors in development cooperation. It also showed how this relationship is strongly 
interconnected with and affected by three other key accountability relationships (2, 3, 4). This 
section will continue by presenting the main categories of practices that can be differentiated within 
promoting public accountability in development cooperation. Subsequently, it will explore how they 
relate to the underlying conceptual ideas and ideologies of donors and what is known about the 
effects of these practices.  
Although a multitude of actors in the aid business, ranging from bilateral donors, multilateral 
organisations as the World Bank, United Nations, the European Union and the OECD and INGOs like 
Oxfam and ICCO, IDEA and Transparency International, is working on promoting public 
accountability, their practices vary in form and approaches.  By reviewing their practices, four 
categories can be distinguished that gradually evolved, in line with the rising status of public 
accountability in development cooperation as described in section two, into stronger and more direct 
interventions in recipient countries.  
Categories of Practices: 
• Demanding public accountability by forums from actors, especially by donors from 
recipients; 
• Advocating public accountability by bilateral, multilateral and INGO’s; 
• Indirectly encouraging public accountability in recipient countries by introducing policies and 
strategies of which donors assume or hope that they will indirectly lead to better domestic 
public accountability in recipient countries: accountability as an anticipated by-product;  
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• Directly co-creating public accountability institutions, mechanisms and relationships by 
donors and recipient governments and/or NGOs in aid recipient countries.  
The first category of practices, demanding public accountability, originated in the eighties in the 
slipstream of the neo-liberal orientation in the Western world in general and following the New 
Public Management trends that were used in the private sector. Both were reflected in the 
development paradigm, the so called Washington Consensus, in which financial and performance 
accountability were emphasized.  This was partly due to the greater pressure on multilateral 
institutions to be more accountable themselves, to their funders, running the risk of being defunded 
(Fox and Brown 1998:9, Jordan and Van Tuyl 2006). However, its importance has not diminished 
since then. Bilateral and multilateral donors still demand transparent accountancy of aid receiving 
governments, INGOs and NGOs with regard to the spending of their money and the effects realized. 
In this practice the donors (forum) not only demand but also promote increased accountability from 
their counterparts, the recipient governments/or NGOs (actors). This is done by practices like 
technical assistance and financial and managerial capacity building of departments of recipient 
governments or of NGOs. INGOs employed similar capacity building practices towards local NGOs. 
Advocating public accountability is the second category of practices. It refers to the attempt of 
donors to convince recipient actors of the necessity and advantages of public accountability for 
democratization and effective public service delivery. This trend was encouraged by the growing 
perception that recipient governments failed in delivering public services and NGOs could do this 
much better, as well as by the democratization wave in the early nineties of the last century. Two 
sets of practices in advocating public accountability emerged. The first set of these practices focused 
on compensating for some kind of democratic deficit: either in the relation between recipient 
governments and their citizens, in the relation between NGOs and their beneficiaries or in the 
relation between recipients and donors. Therefore particularly INGOs and NGOs concentrated on 
strengthening a more demand driven approach of development cooperation by supporting the 
demand side of accountability with capacity building activities that increased awareness, voice and 
participation in decision-making processes among citizens and civil society actors. Bilateral, 
multilateral donors as well as INGOs also concentrated on more effective service delivery,  by 
facilitating, training and funding NGOs, by capacitating government with technical, administrative 
and managerial skills, as well as by focusing increasingly on anti-corruption programs within  
government as well as by creating independent watch dogs like Anti-corruption agencies or 
supporting local offices of Transparency International.
 
 In this type of practices, most donors are 
‘ideal driven’ and are not directly participating as stakeholders (actor or forum) in the accountability 
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relationships that they support. Next to these two sets of practices, advocating accountability also 
refers to a trend among INGOs and NGOs to start discussing their NGO accountabilities more 
extensively towards themselves, their mission, their donors and their beneficiaries (Jordan and Van 
Tuyl 2006).
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A third category of practices are those that indirectly encourage accountability. Bilateral and 
multilateral donors co-design and co-implement development policy programs with recipient 
governments, particularly those related to national development plans and the national budget, that 
are not targeting public accountability directly, but assume accountability to be enhanced as a side 
effect along the way. This is done by turning the promotion of domestic public accountability into a 
condition for obtaining that particular aid modality. Thus an increase in (domestic) accountability is 
expected as a spin off from demanding policy reforms.  Well known in the past are the activities of 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concerning the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Eberlei 2007, Wilhelm and Krause 2008).
24
More recently since the Paris 
Declaration, OECD/DAC donors increasingly apply (general and sector) budget support that also uses 
the improvement of domestic public accountability as a condition for providing aid. The latter, as 
argued in section three, is not only seen by donors as necessary for the long term sustainability of 
development outcomes and democratization in recipient countries, it also provides better 
guarantees for donors to be able to account for aid spending and results to their constituencies. 
Directly Co-creating accountability institutions, mechanisms and relationships is the fourth and last 
category of practices that can be distinguished in promoting public accountability in development 
cooperation. This set of practices deals with direct concrete interventions in constructing 
accountability institutions, mechanisms and the functioning of actor-forum relations. It is called co-
creation because donors work together with parties on both the supply (government/state 
institutions) and the demand side (citizens and civil society organizations) of an accountability 
relation. It gained importance over the last 5 years as it complements the previous set of practices in 
which the assumption that public accountability would be strengthened as a side effect of poverty 
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 See for instance Kovach c.s. 2003:1, see for more information on INGO internal accountability: 
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/csoproject/initiatives-international.php, 
http://www.keystoneaccountability.org/files/Annex%20NGO%20Accountability%20Initiatives%20and%20Pape
rs.pdf; http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/accountability/index.html;http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org/ 
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 See also note 14  
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reduction strategies for example, turned out not to lead to the expected results.  Active direct 
involvement in creating accountability institutions and relations takes this approach one step further 
and is necessary while working with instruments like budget support that presupposes and needs a 
functioning system of public accountability in order to be legitimate (Eberlei 2007, Wilhelm and 
Krause 2008:53, OECD-DAC 2009).  
This last set of practices of accountability promotion, co-creating institutions, mechanisms and 
relations became dominant in recent years. It needs extra attention because its activities touch the 
real world of the workings and effects of public accountability relationships. Most of these concrete 
activities in the sphere of co-creating accountability institutions or relations concentrate on a specific 
component of an accountability relationship. Activities can be grouped using a combination of four 
dimensions. See also figure 2.  
i. The first dimension is the level at which activities are carried out, national or local. Is it for 
instance the decision-making process and reporting on the national budget that must be 
accounted for, or the way decisions are carried out and the budget is spent at the local or 
sectoral level? 
 
ii. The second dimension is the status of the accountability relationship on which the activity 
focuses. Is the activity supporting the supply (actor) or demand (forum) side of an 
accountability relation or both? 
 
iii. The third dimension is the nature of the contribution made by the intervention. Is it helping 
to build institutions such as appointing an ombudsman, establish a public finance 
management system, create a client council? Is it strengthening existing institutions through 
capacity building of for instance MPs and NGOs? Is it supporting specific interactions 
between the demand and the supply side; from providing information and organising a 
response to the mobilising of ‘voice’? Or is it targeting the learning of organizations and 
institutions, for redressing failing policies and improving future ones by supporting 
monitoring and evaluation for example? 
 
iv. The fourth dimension is the phase of public accountability on which the activity focuses: from 
supplying information (transparency & information) via the dialogue and negotiation 
between the two sides in an accountability relationship (answerability), to issuing a 
judgement on or sanctioning those rendering account (enforceability of sanctions).  
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Figure 2: Four dimensions of activities on co-creating public accountability relations 
 
i. Level   ii. Status     iii .Contribution of  iv. Phase of accountability 
             intervention  
 
National   Supply   Institution building I Informing / transparency 
e.g. ’construction site of  Government & public 
The national budget’ service providers  Capacity development II Debating/negotiating/ 
         Answerability 
Local / sectoral  Demand   Action (supporting  
e.g. ’implementation  NGOs, civil society and/or facilitating) III Sanctioning / correcting / 
of the budget’  and citizens     enforceability 
       Learning (M&E)  
 
When evaluating and analysing donor practices, many of the activities on co-creating accountability 
institutions and relations combine different aspects of these four dimensions. 
25
 Two combinations 
turn out to be the most common and frequently applied: 
1. National level/ e.g. National budget/supply/institution building & capacity development / 
transparency 
The first combination involves activities related to the national level, for instance the national 
budget. They focus on strengthening the supply side, government agencies, to improve reporting on 
public spending in the form of public finance management systems, the creation of audit offices and 
the appointment of an ombudsman (transparency and partly answerability). Here government 
agencies from donors, specialists from multilateral organizations or international NGOs work 
together with the government of the recipient country.  
2. Local level/e.g. implementation budget/demand/institution building & capacity 
development/ answerability 
The second combination concerns the local or sectoral level and concentrates on building the 
capacity of civil society organisations to help mobilise demand for public accountability 
(answerability). In these activities it is not so much the government of the recipient country that is 
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 See: Bakker (2010); Lister and Carter (2006); OECD (2007)Rocha Menocal and Sharma (2008); Speijcken 
(2009); UNDP Evaluation and country reports; World Bank Stock-takings; Williamson and Dom (2010); Wood et 
al (2008) ; also based on interviews by the authors 
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the partner in co-creating public accountability institutions, but local interest groups and NGOs that 
work together with INGOs, sometimes supported by government agencies from donor countries as 
well.  
Activities aimed at direct intervention in an accountability process, like the interaction between 
supply and demand sides is far less common. The same applies for activities aimed at the second and 
third phase of the accountability process, delivering judgment, sanctioning, enforceability or 
mechanisms for redress.  
Different practices, different ideologies 
Although all of the aforementioned activities claim to support public democratic accountability, two 
different conceptual ideas can be recognized that underlie the promotion and therefore practices of 
public accountability in development cooperation. One is democratization and the other is 
effectiveness of public service provision by government. The first finds its origin in democratic 
theory, the second developed out of new public management and international political economy 
theories. Although both are considered to reflect key functions of public accountability in a society, 
their conceptual roots represent different points of concern (Bovens and Schillemans, 2009). Many 
donor policies and practices combine elements of the two, but tend to favor one over the other.  For 
instance were the World Bank focuses mostly on the idea of effectiveness in public service provision 
and therefore also on anti-corruption policies, some European donors tend to pay more attention to 
developing participation and voice of citizens in decision-making processes or improving the 
functioning of parliaments and political parties.  A possible explanation for this is that these two 
conceptual ideas link to the different underlying ideologies of donors which to some extent are 
reflected in the different policies of donor agencies. When the choice is made for promoting public 
accountability through advocacy or co-creating institutions of accountability on the demand side 
there is more consideration for the concept of democratization. Indirectly encouraging accountability 
via other policies (like PRSPs) and co-creating institutions on the supply side seems to emphasize 
effective service delivery and governance more.  
Effects of promoting accountability 
Now what do we know about the effects of the different practices of promoting public 
accountability? There are a growing number of evaluation reports on accountability practices of 
different donors, from more general budget and sector support evaluations of OECD/DAC donors, to 
some evaluations on general donor practices in accountability promotion, to evaluations in 
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democratization assistance programs of the UNDP or of independent institutions or NGOs. However, 
these reports hardly give an oversight of donor interventions in this area. Therefore, analyzing the 
different evaluation reports shows that little is known about the real effects of accountability 
promotion practices. Donors tend to engage in a broad and diverse spectrum of activities of which on 
an aggregated level both the coherence and the effects are not directly visible. Most reports 
conclude that the effects are fragmented, hard to attribute to specific interventions and that there is 
a huge gap between the intended and realized results. Formal institutions have been built, but 
functioning public accountability relations are still hardly existent. Although donors very much agree 
on the importance of promoting public accountability and more in particular, domestic public 
accountability in recipient countries, their search for the golden standard is still elusive, causing an 
overall sense of disappointment.   
5. How to understand donors’ disappointment with results up to now?  
The disappointment of donors with the results of their policies and practices up to now, particularly 
with regard to enhancing domestic public accountability between government and citizens in 
recipient countries, can be better apprehended by analyzing donor concepts, policies and practices in 
promoting public accountability, like has been done in the prior sections. This leads to the 
identification of two important mismatches. There is a mismatch between expectations and results 
and between efforts (or type of practices) and results.  This refers to two distinct elements. The first 
element is the mismatch in expectations on what efforts (type of practices) will lead to an increase of 
public accountability. The second element is the mismatch in expectations of where an increase in - 
formal - public accountability will lead to improvements in terms of democracy and public service 
delivery performance. In order to understand these mismatches, this paper proposes to look at 
donor concepts, policies and practices in promoting domestic public accountability from a three 
dimensional perspective in which each dimension represents a distinct world of domestic 
accountability.  
The first world is that of domestic accountability as a democratic and administrative ideal. In this 
ideal world of concepts, domestic accountability is merely seen as a rational part of good 
governance. The majority of books and articles on domestic public accountability in developing 
countries, as well as World Bank and OECD publications, have so far focused mainly on its conceptual 
development and formulation. Domestic accountability is more a prospect for the future than a 
present-day reality. It is predominantly a matter of analysing the characteristics of the accountability 
relation between governments and citizens and their assumed significance for legitimate, responsive 
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and effective governance. If there is an empirical dimension, it lies mainly in a study of the 
differences between the ideal-typical model and current reality, the results of which are then used to 
identify which links in public accountability are absent or weak. However, an evidence-based 
intervention theory is not yet available. How accountability relationships promote responsive and 
effective governance, and under what circumstances, cannot therefore be substantiated by existing 
literature. The same applies to the question of how best to encourage the development of these 
missing links in accountability relationships, and under what circumstances.   
Furthermore, questions can be raised when looking at the premises of this ideal world of concepts. 
On the one hand as Ebrahim and Weisband state, because “they are greatly based on rationalist 
principal-agent logics in ways that stress the current value-laden and technocratic underpinnings of 
the concept “(2007:2). And, they continue, “while (the principal agent perspective) no doubt is 
useful, (it) is nonetheless constrained in its ability to explain how accountability functions in practice” 
(idem:8).  On the other hand because they are essentially based on the concept of the nation state 
(state based accountability mechanisms) while the reality of development cooperation, as well as the 
public policy making process in developing countries, nowadays takes place in a multilevel 
governance context where multiple accountability actors and forums interact on multiple levels and, 
particularly external accountabilities, often are not constituted in a democratic way.  
The second world is the world of donor policies on domestic accountability. In these policies, 
promoting a form of domestic accountability that is not too far from the aforementioned ideal-
typical model, is a key prerequisite for justifying the provision of for instance budget support. 
However, such policies are inherently inconsistent. Despite the lack of an evidence-based 
intervention theory, the almost total absence of a touchstone in the form of specific policy 
instruments and limited capacity to intervene or maintain a consistent approach, these policies are 
nevertheless based on the technical rationale of using resources to attain specific goals within a 
specific timeframe. This is reflected in efforts to attain measurable results attributable to the donor’s 
interventions and to achieve certain outcomes within a defined period. The ideal-typical concept of 
domestic accountability is thus approached from an instrumentalist perspective in intervention 
policies. Next to that, here again, the consequences for promoting domestic public accountability 
that arise from the complexity of the multilevel governance context in which policies come about and 
need to be applied, are largely disregarded. 
The third world is the world of grass root practices of domestic accountability in local governance 
and public services. From donors, including NGOs and their partners, it is expected to intervene in 
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ways that brings the ideal-typical model of domestic accountability demonstrably closer. However, 
local practices are characterised by a complex local governance context that has its own dynamics in 
which informal and formal accountabilities interact but that tends to be dominated by informal, 
binding relationships and personal interests that are based on trust in persons rather than on formal 
contracts.  Governance is more relation-based as opposed to rule-based governance that presides in 
donor countries (Boesen 2007:86).  
These three different worlds clash in the multilevel governance context of development cooperation 
(see a figure 1).  This is not only true for the world of ideal-typical concepts and the world of local 
practices, but also for the world of donor policies and the world of local practices in which the 
realities of local practices combined with the status of donors as relative outsiders, are not in line 
with the instrumental logic that characterizes the world of donor policymaking. Wishes and 
expectations based on a simplified and therefore questionable world of ideal-types conflict with local 
realities and therefore with what is feasible in practice. Or in other words, there is a huge gap 
between how accountability is imagined and how it operates (Ebrahim and Weisband 2007:13). This 
explains, at least with regard to donors’ approaches, for the rather disappointing results up to now. 
6. Towards a more evidence based and or modest approach  
What is it that we do not know and that we need to know in order to become more effective? And 
how can we use our existing knowledge in a more effective way? These are the questions that 
remain after exploring what public accountability in development cooperation is about and trying to 
understand why accountability promotion policies did not meet their expectations yet. Therefore this 
last section outlines some directions for future research and some provisional guidelines for future 
interventions. 
From the previous sections it can be concluded that only little is known about what type of practices 
and interventions lead to the creation of functioning accountability relations. Formal accountability 
institutions have been developed, not in the last place as a result of conditionality in development 
cooperation. And although case studies show an increase in accountability institutions, especially on 
the national level, they also demonstrate that in general there is institutional fragmentation and only 
a limited insight and knowledge of how these institutions function in practice (Wilhelm and Krause 
2008:55) Not much is knows about under what conditions these institutions would function more 
effectively. Similarly, knowledge about the effects of specific accountability relations on for instance 
democratic representation, government responsiveness or public service delivery is hardly available.   
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In order to develop more effective accountability interventions more empirical driven, or evidence 
based, notions about accountability promotion as an instrument for strengthening democracy and 
improving performance in public services need to be developed.  Therefore there is a need to go 
back to basics in a way with a more systematic research agenda on three fronts: 
• Research on what (co-creating) activities of accountability promotion under what kind of 
circumstances lead to functioning accountability institutions, in which accountability is 
looked at as a social phenomenon instead of only as a technocratic administrative necessity  
• Research on how public accountability relations function in practice in relation to other 
(multilevel) accountability relations 
• Research on the effects of (more) accountability practices on representation and public 
performance.  
The world of development cooperation is not unique in terms of a lack of empirical research on 
accountability. Overall, most attention has been paid to come to conceptual clarity. Only recently 
more systematic attention is paid to the actual functioning world of these practices particularly in the 
multilevel context of the EU that might be interesting for development cooperation as well (Bovens  
et al 2010). 
Although there are relatively few empirical studies available, there are some provisional and still 
quite general guidelines that can be given to donors working in this area: 
• From grand design to incremental practices that are characterized by modesty and realisms 
in terms of what one can expect and do as an external actor  
• From external pressure and demands to fostering endogenous developments especially on 
the local and regional level  
Researching and promoting public accountability in development cooperation is a complex multilevel 
multi-actor process that should not be about finding a golden standard that runs the risk of being 
based on normative agendas, instead, it should focus on researching and assessing empirical realities 
that can inform future policies and interventions, while having a long term and rather modest 
perspective with regard to bringing about change.  
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